Europe is being pushed to acknowledge a reality many leaders long avoided stating openly: the security assumptions that shaped the post–Cold War era may no longer hold. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, growing pressure from Washington, and increasingly direct warnings from military officials, the European Union is acting with an urgency rarely seen before to prepare for the possibility of a broader conflict.
For decades, Europe’s security framework relied on three core foundations: diplomacy, economic interdependence, and the protection provided by the United States through NATO. That framework is now under significant strain. The war in Ukraine shows no clear path to resolution, relations among allies have become more transactional, and confidence in automatic U.S. military backing is no longer assured. In Brussels, the shift in tone is unmistakable. Discussions focus less on abstract risks and more on concrete timelines, logistics, and operational readiness. The debate is no longer about whether Europe should prepare for war, but whether it can do so quickly enough.
This sense of urgency has been building for years. Russia’s invasion shattered the belief that large-scale warfare on European soil belonged to the past. At the same time, signals from Washington have grown more explicit. U.S. leaders have made it clear they expect Europe to shoulder far greater responsibility for its own defense, both financially and militarily.
In December, EU leaders approved a new €90 billion loan package for Ukraine, reaffirming their commitment to Kyiv despite rising domestic pressures. Around the same time, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled a series of defense initiatives aimed at strengthening Europe’s deterrence capacity by 2030. These actions were accompanied by unusually blunt statements from global leaders.
Russian President Vladimir Putin warned in early December that Russia was prepared to fight if necessary and suggested negotiations could soon become impossible. Shortly afterward, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte delivered a stark warning, stating, “We are Russia’s next target,” and cautioning that an attack on NATO territory could occur within five years. Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, echoed the concern, remarking that Europe may already have experienced its “last summer of peace.”
Taken together, these messages leave little ambiguity. The threat is no longer hypothetical, and time is no longer on Europe’s side.
Public readiness, however, tells a more complex story. A recent Euronews poll asked whether individuals would personally fight to defend EU borders. Among nearly 10,000 respondents, 75 percent said they would not. Only 19 percent said they would, while the rest were undecided. The results highlight a widening gap between government preparedness and public willingness.
Public concern varies sharply by region. Fear of Russian aggression is strongest in countries closest to Russia. A YouGov survey found that Russian military pressure ranks among the top national threats for 51 percent of respondents in Poland, 57 percent in Lithuania, and 62 percent in Denmark. Across the EU, armed conflict now sits alongside economic instability and energy security as one of the public’s top concerns.
This growing sense of danger has driven the most decisive action in Eastern and Northern Europe. Countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Finland, and Sweden—shaped by geography and historical experience—have moved faster than many of their Western counterparts.
Lithuania has begun developing “drone walls” along its borders and is working with Latvia to restore wetlands as natural defensive barriers. Civil defense exercises, emergency drills, and public resilience campaigns have become routine. Lithuanian authorities have distributed shelter maps and emergency hotline information nationwide, while Latvia has introduced mandatory national defense education in schools.
Poland has reinforced its border with Belarus using physical barriers and expanded security education programs. In some secondary schools, firearm safety instruction is now included in the curriculum. Finland, Estonia, and Sweden have revived Cold War–era civil defense practices, publishing updated guides that explain how citizens should respond to crises, blackouts, evacuations, or wartime conditions. In 2025, Sweden mailed a revised version of its “If Crisis or War Comes” brochure to every household.
Online behavior reflects this shift. In countries closest to Russia, searches for terms like “nearest shelter” and “what to pack for evacuation” surged throughout 2025, suggesting that concern has moved beyond theory.
At the EU level, these national efforts are being matched by what may be the most ambitious defense coordination push in the union’s history. European defense spending exceeded €300 billion in 2024, and under the proposed 2028–2034 budget, €131 billion has been earmarked for aerospace and defense—five times more than in the previous funding cycle.
Central to this strategy is Readiness 2030, a plan endorsed by all 27 EU member states. Its objectives are highly practical: enable military forces and equipment to move across EU borders within three days in peacetime and within six hours during emergencies. To achieve this, the EU is developing a “Military Schengen” system designed to remove bureaucratic barriers that currently delay troop movement.
Approximately 500 critical infrastructure sites—bridges, tunnels, ports, and railways—are being assessed for upgrades to handle heavy military equipment. Estimated costs range from €70 to €100 billion, funded through national budgets and EU programs such as the Connecting Europe Facility.
In 2025, Brussels launched ReArm Europe, a central coordination platform intended to align national defense investments and accelerate industrial output. Europe’s defense sector has long suffered from fragmentation, duplicated systems, and inefficient procurement. ReArm Europe aims to address these weaknesses directly.
Two initiatives anchor this effort. The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) provides €1.5 billion for joint research, development, and production, requiring participation from multiple EU countries or Ukraine. The Strategic Armament Financing Envelope (SAFE) offers a €150 billion EU-backed loan facility to enable faster, cheaper joint weapons procurement.
Pressure from the United States has further intensified these moves. A U.S. national security strategy released in December described Europe as a weakened partner and reinforced an “America First” stance. Echoing past criticisms from former President Donald Trump, the document signaled expectations that Europe should assume primary responsibility for NATO’s conventional defense by 2027.
At the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, allies agreed to aim for defense spending equal to 5 percent of GDP by 2035—an ambitious target most European nations remain far from meeting. The strategy also criticized European migration policies and regulatory frameworks, raising concerns in Brussels that U.S. security guarantees may no longer be unconditional.
European leaders responded swiftly. Officials including Valdis Dombrovskis, António Costa, and Kaja Kallas rejected Washington’s assessment, stressing that allies do not dictate one another’s democratic choices. Still, the exchange underscored a growing transatlantic divide over Europe’s long-term strategic independence.
Despite increased budgets and political momentum, experts caution that funding alone will not solve Europe’s defense challenges. Regulatory hurdles, slow procurement processes, and limited industrial capacity remain major obstacles. Preliminary results from the EU’s Defence Industrial Readiness Survey confirm persistent delays and compatibility issues.
Demand, however, is accelerating rapidly. SAFE has already received applications for nearly 700 projects, with close to €50 billion requested for air defense systems, ammunition, missiles, drones, and naval capabilities. Up to €22.5 billion in pre-financing could be released by early 2026.
Europe is now racing against time, structural constraints, and political realities. As many officials privately acknowledge, the era of strategic complacency has ended. What remains uncertain is whether Europe can transform urgency into real capability before circumstances force the issue.